GHSA-q6hv-wcjr-wp8h json
kcp is missing update validation allows arbitrary LogicalCluster status patches through initializingworkspaces Virtual Workspace
published last yr. modified 8mo ago also GO-2025-3985
- cvss
- —
- not scored
- cisa kev
- Not listed
- not in CISA's catalog
- epss
- —
- no score, EPSS covers CVEs only
- public exploits
- 0
- none known
Summary
### Impact
Because UPDATE validation is not being applied, it is possible for an actor with access to an instance of the [initializingworkspaces virtual workspace](https://docs.kcp.io/kcp/latest/concepts/workspaces/workspace-initialization/) to run arbitrary patches on the status field of `LogicalCluster` objects while the workspace is initializing.
This allows to add or remove any initializers as well as changing the phase of a `LogicalCluster` (to "Ready" for example).
As this effectively allows to skip certain initializers or the entire initialization phase, potential integrations with external systems such as billing or security could be affected. Their initializers could be skipped by a `WorkspaceType` that adds another initializer and grants permissions to the virtual workspace to a rogue or compromised entity.
_Who is impacted?_
* Impacts other owners of `WorkspaceTypes` with initializers that are inherited by other `WorkspaceTypes`. * Impacts developers using the `virtual/framework` package to create their own virtualworkspaces if they are using UpdateFuncs in their custom storageWrappers.
### Details
The issue occurs because the [rest.ValidateObjectUpdateFunc](https://github.com/kcp-dev/kcp/blob/cli/v0.28.1/pkg/virtual/framework/forwardingregistry/store.go#L174) is not being called within the DefaultDynamicDelegatedStoreFuncs. As a result, the intended status overwrite protection from initializers never gets called, allowing arbitrary logicalcluster status patches.
### Patches
The problem has been patched in #3599 and is available in kcp 0.28.3 and higher.
### Workarounds
- Further limit access to the `initialize` verb on `WorkspaceType` objects (see [documentation](https://docs.kcp.io/kcp/v0.28/concepts/workspaces/workspace-initialization/#enforcing-permissions-for-initializers) for details). - Only use trusted `WorkspaceType` objects.
### References
See the pull request (#3599).
Patch / fix
- go github.com/kcp-dev/kcp 0.28.3
- github.com/kcp-dev/kcp@02134a2 commit
- github.com/kcp-dev/kcp#3599 pull request
- github.com/kcp-dev/kcp/releases/tag/v0.28.3 release
Is GHSA-q6hv-wcjr-wp8h in your dependencies? Fencer shows which of your repositories are affected as soon as an advisory lands, and opens the fix as a pull request.
Check with FencerAffected packages
| ecosystem | package | affected | fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| go | github.com/kcp-dev/kcp | <0.28.3 |
0.28.3 |
Classification
- Weakness
-
- CWE-285 Improper Authorization
References
-
github.com
/kcp-dev/kcp/pull/3599
web, patch
-
github.com
/kcp-dev/kcp/commit/02134a2a51d33652ab288cccd7a13539b59c7584
web, patch
-
github.com
/kcp-dev/kcp/security/advisories/GHSA-q6hv-wcjr-wp8h
web, advisory
-
github.com
/kcp-dev/kcp
package
-
github.com
/kcp-dev/kcp/releases/tag/v0.28.3
web
-
pkg.go.dev
/vuln/GO-2025-3985
web
Sources
- GitHub Advisory GHSA-q6hv-wcjr-wp8h
- OSV GO-2025-3985
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