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medium —

GHSA-q95x-7g78-rccv json

OneRingBuf has a Use After Free Vulnerability

published 5mo ago modified 3mo ago also RUSTSEC-2026-0152

cvss
—
not scored
cisa kev
Not listed
not in CISA's catalog
epss
—
no score, EPSS covers CVEs only
public exploits
0
none known

Summary

Affected versions of `oneringbuf` exposed the obsolete `IntoRef::into_ref` method through the public `IntoRef` trait. For heap-backed ring buffers, this method returned a `DroppableRef` handle.

`DroppableRef` stored an owning raw pointer created from `Box::into_raw`. Its `Clone` implementation copied this raw pointer without incrementing the internal `alive_iters` counter. Internally, this clone pattern appears to rely on a fixed number of handles being created to match the initial `alive_iters` value. However, exposing `DroppableRef` through the public `IntoRef::TargetRef` associated type allows safe external code to create additional clones beyond that fixed count, breaking the lifetime protocol. `Drop` later dereferenced the pointer and could free the backing allocation with `Box::from_raw`.

Safe code could call `IntoRef::into_ref` to obtain a `DroppableRef` and then clone it. Each clone pointed to the same allocation, but the internal `alive_iters` counter was not increased. As a result, one clone could free the allocation while another clone still existed. Dropping the remaining clone then accessed freed memory, causing a heap-use-after-free.

The issue was fixed in version 0.8.0 by removing the obsolete `into_ref` method.

## Trigger

```rust use oneringbuf::{IntoRef, LocalHeapRB};

fn main() { let rb = LocalHeapRB::<usize>::from(vec![1, 2, 3]);

let r = <LocalHeapRB<usize> as IntoRef>::into_ref(rb); let r2 = r.clone(); let r3 = r.clone();

drop(r); drop(r2); drop(r3); // AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free } ```

Patch / fix

  • crates.io oneringbuf 0.8.0

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Affected packages

ecosystem package affected fixed in
crates.io oneringbuf
<0.8.0
>=0.0.0-0, <0.8.0
0.8.0

Classification

Weakness

References

Sources

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