Skip to content
Fencer Intel
low 3.7

GHSA-r27j-894h-3w3p json

mcp-data-vis vulnerable to denial of service via unsanitized `select` key lookup on `Object.prototype` with `precompile: true`

published 6mo ago modified 6mo ago

cvss
3.7
version 3.1, GitHub
cisa kev
Not listed
not in CISA's catalog
epss
—
no score, EPSS covers CVEs only
public exploits
0
none known

Summary

## Summary

`icu-minify`'s runtime formatter resolves `select` branches by looking up the runtime value as a plain property on a prototype-bearing object. When the value coerces to a key that exists on `Object.prototype` (e.g. `toString`, `__proto__`, `constructor`, `hasOwnProperty`, `valueOf`), the lookup returns a truthy value that short-circuits the `?? options.other` fallback, and the downstream iterator crashes with `TypeError: nodes is not iterable`. Any consumer that forwards user input into a `{arg, select, …}` placeholder — a common idiom for `role`, `status`, `type`, `gender` — can be crashed per-request by supplying one of those keys. In Next.js SSR (via `next-intl` with `experimental.messages.precompile`) this yields a 500 for the affected render.

## Details

### Vulnerable code paths

Compilation produces a plain object whose prototype chain includes all `Object.prototype` members:

```tsx // packages/icu-minify/src/compile.tsx:191-199 function compileSelect(node: SelectElement): CompiledNode { const options: SelectOptions = {}; // <-- plain object, inherits from Object.prototype

for (const [key, option] of Object.entries(node.options)) { options[key] = compileNodesToNode(option.value); }

return [node.value, TYPE_SELECT, options]; } ```

At runtime, the formatter looks up the user-controllable value directly on that object:

```tsx // packages/icu-minify/src/format.tsx:226-244 function formatSelect<RichTextElement>( name: string, options: SelectOptions, locale: string, values: FormatValues<RichTextElement>, formatOptions: FormatOptions, pluralCtx: PluralContext | undefined ): string | RichTextElement | Array<string | RichTextElement> { const value = String(getValue(values, name)); // 234: coerce to string, no sanitization const branch: CompiledNode | undefined = options[value] ?? options.other; // 235: unsafe lookup

if (process.env.NODE_ENV !== 'production' && !branch) { throw new Error( `No matching branch for select "${name}" with value "${value}"` ); }

return formatBranch(branch, locale, values, formatOptions, pluralCtx); // 243 } ```

Because `options` inherits from `Object.prototype`, lookups such as `options['toString']` return `Object.prototype.toString` — a truthy `Function`. The `?? options.other` fallback is therefore skipped, and the non-array, non-string branch is passed to `formatBranch`, which forwards it to `formatNodes`:

```tsx // packages/icu-minify/src/format.tsx:286-308 function formatBranch<RichTextElement>( branch: CompiledNode, /* … */ ) { if (typeof branch === 'string') return branch; // string: fine if (branch === TYPE_POUND) return formatNode(/* … */); // pound: fine return formatNodes(branch as Array<CompiledNode>, /* … */); // 301: Function is not iterable }

// packages/icu-minify/src/format.tsx:73-92 function formatNodes<RichTextElement>( nodes: Array<CompiledNode>, /* … */ ): Array<string | RichTextElement> { const result: Array<string | RichTextElement> = []; for (const node of nodes) { // 82: TypeError: nodes is not iterable /* … */ } return result; } ```

Five bare-prototype keys reliably crash the formatter in production: `toString`, `__proto__`, `constructor`, `hasOwnProperty`, `valueOf` (plus `propertyIsEnumerable`, `isPrototypeOf`, `toLocaleString`). Note the development branch at line 237 (`throw new Error('No matching branch for select …')`) is bypassed because the inherited function is truthy — so this is not masked in development either.

### Why `formatPlural` is not affected

`formatPlural` (format.tsx:246-284) looks safe for two independent reasons and does not need to be patched for this specific bug:

1. Exact-match keys use the `=${value}` prefix (`exactKey = '=' + value`, line 263), so the attacker would need to supply e.g. `=toString`, which is not a member of `Object.prototype`. 2. The category branch uses `formatOptions.formatters.getPluralRules(locale, {type}).select(value)` which returns a fixed enum (`zero|one|two|few|many|other`), never attacker-supplied.

The bug is specific to the `select` path where the raw string value is used as the lookup key.

### Reachability

- **Direct consumers of `icu-minify`**: any code calling `format(compiled, locale, values, …)` where `values[arg]` for a `select` placeholder comes from user input is vulnerable with no additional preconditions. - **`next-intl` users** who enable `experimental.messages.precompile` (`packages/next-intl/src/plugin/types.tsx:24`, wired in `packages/next-intl/src/plugin/getNextConfig.tsx:177-293`): the runtime at `packages/use-intl/src/core/format-message/format-only.tsx` forwards directly to `icu-minify/format`, so `t('msg', {role: req.query.role})` against a `{role, select, admin {…} other {…}}` message crashes the render.

No middleware, type guard, escaping, or framework default stands between user input and the unsafe lookup — `values` reaches `format()` unmodified.

## PoC

Verified dynamically against `packages/icu-minify/src/format.tsx` at commit `b4aa538` (v4.9.1) with vitest and `NODE_ENV=production`.

Reproduction (drop into `packages/icu-minify/test/poc.test.ts` and run `pnpm exec vitest run test/poc.test.ts`):

```ts import {describe, expect, it} from 'vitest'; import compile from '../src/compile.js'; import format, {type FormatOptions} from '../src/format.js';

const formatters: FormatOptions['formatters'] = { getDateTimeFormat: (...a) => new Intl.DateTimeFormat(...a), getNumberFormat: (...a) => new Intl.NumberFormat(...a), getPluralRules: (...a) => new Intl.PluralRules(...a) };

describe('select prototype-key DoS', () => { const compiled = compile('{role, select, admin {Admin} user {User} other {Guest}}');

for (const key of ['toString', '__proto__', 'constructor', 'hasOwnProperty', 'valueOf']) { it(`crashes on role="${key}"`, () => { process.env.NODE_ENV = 'production'; expect(() => format(compiled, 'en', {role: key}, {formatters})) .toThrow(TypeError); // "nodes is not iterable" }); } }); ```

Observed output (each of the 5 keys):

``` TypeError: nodes is not iterable at formatNodes (packages/icu-minify/src/format.tsx:82:22) at formatBranch (packages/icu-minify/src/format.tsx:301:10) at formatSelect (packages/icu-minify/src/format.tsx:243:10) at formatNode (packages/icu-minify/src/format.tsx:150:14) at formatNodes (packages/icu-minify/src/format.tsx:83:23) at format (packages/icu-minify/src/format.tsx:64:18) ```

End-to-end Next.js scenario (illustrative — any attacker-controlled `role`/`status`/`type`/`gender` forwarded into a `select` placeholder triggers the same exception inside the server render):

```tsx // app/[locale]/profile/page.tsx — assume precompile enabled export default async function Page({searchParams}: {searchParams: Promise<{role?: string}>}) { const t = await getTranslations('Profile'); const {role = 'other'} = await searchParams; return <h1>{t('greeting', {role})}</h1>; // ^^^^^ messages: { "greeting": "{role, select, admin {Hi admin} other {Hi}}" } } ```

``` curl -i 'https://target.example/en/profile?role=toString' HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error ```

## Impact

- **Availability**: An unauthenticated attacker can force a 500 response on any page or API route that formats a `select` ICU message using user-controllable input. Each request fails independently; there is no persistent state corruption or amplification beyond the malicious request. - **Confidentiality / Integrity**: None. No data is leaked and no prototype write occurs — this is a prototype-chain *read* confusion, not a prototype pollution write. - **Scope**: Any consumer of `icu-minify` that passes user input into a `select` branch is vulnerable. `next-intl` users are only exposed if they have opted into the experimental `experimental.messages.precompile` flag. - **Preconditions**: Developer must forward untrusted input to a `{arg, select, …}` placeholder. This is a routine pattern (`role`, `status`, `gender`, `type`) and the library offers no documentation warning that `select` keys must be validated against prototype members.

## Recommended Fix

Either of the following (defense-in-depth suggests both). Both are one-line, minimal-churn fixes.

1. Use a null-prototype map in `compileSelect` (and symmetrically in `compilePlural`) so that no `Object.prototype` keys can ever be resolved:

```tsx // packages/icu-minify/src/compile.tsx function compileSelect(node: SelectElement): CompiledNode { - const options: SelectOptions = {}; + const options: SelectOptions = Object.create(null);

for (const [key, option] of Object.entries(node.options)) { options[key] = compileNodesToNode(option.value); }

return [node.value, TYPE_SELECT, options]; } ```

2. Gate the runtime lookup with `Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call` so the `other` fallback is reached for any non-own key:

```tsx // packages/icu-minify/src/format.tsx function formatSelect<RichTextElement>(/* … */) { const value = String(getValue(values, name)); - const branch: CompiledNode | undefined = options[value] ?? options.other; + const branch: CompiledNode | undefined = + Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(options, value) ? options[value] : options.other; /* … */ } ```

Option 1 is preferable because it also survives future serialization round-trips (e.g. JSON-hydrated compiled messages) and removes the hazard at the source. Option 2 is a defensive backstop for any code path that constructs `SelectOptions` from arbitrary JSON at runtime.

No regression is expected in tests — `compileSelect` never reads back through the prototype chain, and all existing lookups use own properties.

Patch / fix

  • npm icu-minify 4.9.2

Is GHSA-r27j-894h-3w3p in your dependencies? Fencer shows which of your repositories are affected as soon as an advisory lands, and opens the fix as a pull request.

Check with Fencer

CVSS scores

assigned by version score vector
GitHub 3.1 3.7 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L

Affected packages

ecosystem package affected fixed in
npm icu-minify
<4.9.2
4.9.2

Classification

Weakness
  • CWE-1321 Improperly Controlled Modification of Object Prototype Attributes

References

Sources

Fencer Intel keeps one entry per vulnerability: the CVE id wins, then GHSA, and records that alias each other are merged, except that two CVEs always keep separate entries. The same data is available as JSON.

The maintainers of amannn/next-intl published their own advisory on GitHub. Reviewed sources take precedence over it.