GHSA-rchv-x836-w7xp json
OpenClaw's dashboard leaked gateway auth material via browser URL/query and localStorage
published 8mo ago modified 8mo ago
- cvss
- 7.1
- version 3.1, GitHub
- cisa kev
- Not listed
- not in CISA's catalog
- epss
- —
- no score, EPSS covers CVEs only
- public exploits
- 0
- none known
Summary
OpenClaw's macOS Dashboard flow exposed Gateway authentication material to browser-controlled surfaces.
Before the fix, the macOS app appended the shared Gateway `token` and `password` to the Dashboard URL query string when opening the Control UI in the browser. The Control UI then imported the token and persisted it into browser `localStorage` under `openclaw.control.settings.v1`.
This expanded exposure of reusable Gateway admin credentials into browser address-bar/query surfaces and persistent script-readable storage.
## Affected Packages / Versions
- Package: `openclaw` (npm) - Latest published version verified vulnerable: `2026.3.2` - Affected range: `<= 2026.3.2` - Patched version: `>= 2026.3.7`
## Impact
An attacker with access to browser-controlled surfaces or persistent browser storage could recover a valid Gateway admin token and reuse it against the OpenClaw management interface.
The exposure chain was:
1. macOS `Open Dashboard` constructed a URL with auth material. 2. The browser received that credential-bearing URL. 3. The Control UI imported the token from the URL. 4. The Control UI persisted the token in `localStorage`.
## Fix
The fix aligns the macOS Dashboard flow with the safer existing CLI/bootstrap pattern and removes persistent browser token storage:
- macOS Dashboard now passes the Gateway token via URL fragment instead of query parameters. - macOS Dashboard no longer propagates the shared Gateway password into browser URLs. - Control UI keeps Gateway tokens in memory only for the current tab. - Control UI scrubs legacy persisted tokens from `openclaw.control.settings.v1` on load. - Regression tests cover fragment transport, password omission, and token-scrubbing behavior.
## Fix Commit(s)
- `10d0e3f3ca92326df0ca071fabffe463742f263c` (March 7, 2026)
## Release Process Note
npm `2026.3.7` was published on March 8, 2026. This advisory is fixed in the released package.
Thanks @whiter6666 for reporting.
Patch / fix
- npm openclaw 2026.3.7
Is GHSA-rchv-x836-w7xp in your dependencies? Fencer shows which of your repositories are affected as soon as an advisory lands, and opens the fix as a pull request.
Check with FencerCVSS scores
| assigned by | version | score | vector |
|---|---|---|---|
| GitHub | 3.1 | 7.1 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N |
Affected packages
| ecosystem | package | affected | fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| npm | openclaw | <2026.3.7 |
2026.3.7 |
Classification
- Weakness
-
- CWE-200 Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
References
Sources
- GitHub Advisory GHSA-rchv-x836-w7xp
- Maintainer advisory GHSA-rchv-x836-w7xp
Fencer Intel keeps one entry per vulnerability: the CVE id wins, then GHSA, and records that alias each other are merged, except that two CVEs always keep separate entries. The same data is available as JSON.
The maintainers of openclaw/openclaw published their own advisory on GitHub. Reviewed sources take precedence over it.