GHSA-w5c7-9qqw-6645 json
OpenClaw inter-session prompts could be treated as direct user instructions
published 8mo ago modified 8mo ago
- cvss
- —
- not scored
- cisa kev
- Not listed
- not in CISA's catalog
- epss
- —
- no score, EPSS covers CVEs only
- public exploits
- 0
- none known
Summary
## Summary
Inter-session messages sent via `sessions_send` could be interpreted as direct end-user instructions because they were persisted as `role: "user"` without provenance metadata.
## Affected Packages / Versions
- Package: `openclaw` (npm) - Affected versions: `<= 2026.2.12` (i.e. `< 2026.2.13`) - Fixed in: `2026.2.13` (patched versions `>= 2026.2.13`)
## Impact
A delegated or internal session could inject instructions into another session that appeared equivalent to externally-originated user input.
This is an instruction-provenance confusion issue (confused-deputy style), which can lead to unintended privileged behavior in workflows that trust `role: "user"` as a sole authority signal.
## Technical details
Before the fix, routed inter-session prompts were stored as regular user turns without a verifiable source marker.
As a result, downstream workers and transcript readers could not distinguish: - External user input - Internal inter-session routed input
## Fix
OpenClaw now carries explicit input provenance end-to-end for routed prompts.
Key changes: - Added structured provenance model (`inputProvenance`) with `kind` values including `inter_session`. - `sessions_send` and agent-to-agent steps now set inter-session provenance when invoking target runs. - Provenance is persisted on user messages as `message.provenance.kind = "inter_session"` (role remains `user` for provider compatibility). - Transcript readers and memory helpers were updated to respect provenance and avoid treating inter-session prompts as external user-originated input. - Runtime context rebuilding now annotates inter-session turns with an explicit in-memory marker (`[Inter-session message]`) for clearer model-side disambiguation. - Regression tests were added for transcript parsing, session tools flow, runner sanitization, and memory hook behavior.
## Fix Commit(s)
- `85409e401b6586f83954cb53552395d7aab04797`
## Workarounds
If immediate upgrade is not possible: - Disable or restrict `sessions_send` in affected environments. - Do not use role alone as an authority boundary; require provenance-aware checks in orchestration logic.
## Credit
Reported by @anbecker.
Thanks @anbecker for reporting.
Patch / fix
- npm openclaw 2026.2.13
Is GHSA-w5c7-9qqw-6645 in your dependencies? Fencer shows which of your repositories are affected as soon as an advisory lands, and opens the fix as a pull request.
Check with FencerAffected packages
| ecosystem | package | affected | fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| npm | openclaw | <2026.2.13 |
2026.2.13 |
Classification
- Weakness
-
- CWE-345 Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
References
Sources
- GitHub Advisory GHSA-w5c7-9qqw-6645
- Maintainer advisory GHSA-w5c7-9qqw-6645
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The maintainers of openclaw/openclaw published their own advisory on GitHub. Reviewed sources take precedence over it.