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Fencer Intel
low 2.3

GHSA-x7mm-9vvv-64w8 json

unhead: Streaming SSR `streamKey` injected into inline script without identifier validation

published 7mo ago modified 7mo ago

cvss
2.3
version 4.0, the maintainers
cisa kev
Not listed
not in CISA's catalog
epss
—
no score, EPSS covers CVEs only
public exploits
0
none known

Summary

### Summary

`createStreamableHead({ streamKey })` interpolated its `streamKey` argument directly into the streaming SSR bootstrap and suspense-chunk inline scripts without identifier validation or escaping. If an application forwards untrusted data into that configuration value, the rendered scripts become a script-injection sink.

### Details

`streamKey` was embedded into JavaScript source via dot notation in two public helpers:

* `createBootstrapScript()` returned `<script>window.${streamKey}={...}</script>` * `renderSSRHeadSuspenseChunk()` returned `window.${streamKey}.push(...)`

No escaping, quoting, or identifier validation was applied before these strings were embedded into HTML. A `streamKey` such as `__unhead__;globalThis.PWNED=1;//` broke out of the intended property access and injected arbitrary JavaScript into the page. The JSON escaping used for streamed head entries did not protect `streamKey` because `streamKey` was inserted as raw code rather than as serialized data.

### Impact

`streamKey` is a developer-chosen configuration value rather than a data field — the intended usage is a hardcoded identifier-shaped constant (default `__unhead__`). Exploitation therefore requires an application to explicitly route untrusted input into a configuration sink, which is not a documented or recommended pattern. We have no reports of any downstream project sourcing `streamKey` from request data.

Applications using the default `streamKey`, or any hardcoded custom key, are **not affected**.

### PoC

```ts import { createStreamableHead, renderSSRHeadShell } from 'unhead/stream/server'

const { head } = createStreamableHead({ streamKey: '__unhead__;globalThis.PWNED=1;//', })

const html = renderSSRHeadShell( head, '<!doctype html><html><head></head><body></body></html>', )

// <!doctype html><html><head><script>window.__unhead__;globalThis.PWNED=1;//={_q:[],push(e){this._q.push(e)}}</script>… ```

### Patch

Fixed on `main` in [`64b5ac0`](https://github.com/unjs/unhead/commit/64b5ac0aa30cc256ea6677ce3dc4f132f81b2ff6). The fix will ship in the next patch release of `unhead`.

`streamKey` is now validated against a conservative ASCII JavaScript-identifier pattern (`/^[$_a-z][$\w]*$/i`) at every sink — `createStreamableHead`, `createBootstrapScript`, and the internal stream-key resolver. Invalid values throw immediately instead of being emitted into script output.

### Workarounds

Do not pass untrusted data into `createStreamableHead({ streamKey })` or `createBootstrapScript(key)`. If per-tenant keys are required, whitelist them against an identifier-safe pattern before constructing the head instance.

### Credit

Thanks to @Jvr2022 for the report.

Patch / fix

  • npm unhead 3.0.1

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CVSS scores

assigned by version score vector
the maintainers 4.0 2.3 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N

Affected packages

ecosystem package affected fixed in
npm unhead
>=3.0.0-beta.5, <3.0.1
3.0.1

Classification

Weakness
  • CWE-79 Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation

References

Sources

Fencer Intel keeps one entry per vulnerability: the CVE id wins, then GHSA, and records that alias each other are merged, except that two CVEs always keep separate entries. The same data is available as JSON.

The maintainers of unjs/unhead published their own advisory on GitHub. Reviewed sources take precedence over it.