GHSA-x7mm-9vvv-64w8 json
unhead: Streaming SSR `streamKey` injected into inline script without identifier validation
published 7mo ago modified 7mo ago
- cvss
- 2.3
- version 4.0, the maintainers
- cisa kev
- Not listed
- not in CISA's catalog
- epss
- —
- no score, EPSS covers CVEs only
- public exploits
- 0
- none known
Summary
### Summary
`createStreamableHead({ streamKey })` interpolated its `streamKey` argument directly into the streaming SSR bootstrap and suspense-chunk inline scripts without identifier validation or escaping. If an application forwards untrusted data into that configuration value, the rendered scripts become a script-injection sink.
### Details
`streamKey` was embedded into JavaScript source via dot notation in two public helpers:
* `createBootstrapScript()` returned `<script>window.${streamKey}={...}</script>` * `renderSSRHeadSuspenseChunk()` returned `window.${streamKey}.push(...)`
No escaping, quoting, or identifier validation was applied before these strings were embedded into HTML. A `streamKey` such as `__unhead__;globalThis.PWNED=1;//` broke out of the intended property access and injected arbitrary JavaScript into the page. The JSON escaping used for streamed head entries did not protect `streamKey` because `streamKey` was inserted as raw code rather than as serialized data.
### Impact
`streamKey` is a developer-chosen configuration value rather than a data field — the intended usage is a hardcoded identifier-shaped constant (default `__unhead__`). Exploitation therefore requires an application to explicitly route untrusted input into a configuration sink, which is not a documented or recommended pattern. We have no reports of any downstream project sourcing `streamKey` from request data.
Applications using the default `streamKey`, or any hardcoded custom key, are **not affected**.
### PoC
```ts import { createStreamableHead, renderSSRHeadShell } from 'unhead/stream/server'
const { head } = createStreamableHead({ streamKey: '__unhead__;globalThis.PWNED=1;//', })
const html = renderSSRHeadShell( head, '<!doctype html><html><head></head><body></body></html>', )
// <!doctype html><html><head><script>window.__unhead__;globalThis.PWNED=1;//={_q:[],push(e){this._q.push(e)}}</script>… ```
### Patch
Fixed on `main` in [`64b5ac0`](https://github.com/unjs/unhead/commit/64b5ac0aa30cc256ea6677ce3dc4f132f81b2ff6). The fix will ship in the next patch release of `unhead`.
`streamKey` is now validated against a conservative ASCII JavaScript-identifier pattern (`/^[$_a-z][$\w]*$/i`) at every sink — `createStreamableHead`, `createBootstrapScript`, and the internal stream-key resolver. Invalid values throw immediately instead of being emitted into script output.
### Workarounds
Do not pass untrusted data into `createStreamableHead({ streamKey })` or `createBootstrapScript(key)`. If per-tenant keys are required, whitelist them against an identifier-safe pattern before constructing the head instance.
### Credit
Thanks to @Jvr2022 for the report.
Patch / fix
Is GHSA-x7mm-9vvv-64w8 in your dependencies? Fencer shows which of your repositories are affected as soon as an advisory lands, and opens the fix as a pull request.
Check with FencerCVSS scores
| assigned by | version | score | vector |
|---|---|---|---|
| the maintainers | 4.0 | 2.3 | CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N |
Affected packages
| ecosystem | package | affected | fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| npm | unhead | >=3.0.0-beta.5, <3.0.1 |
3.0.1 |
Classification
- Weakness
-
- CWE-79 Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation
References
Sources
- GitHub Advisory GHSA-x7mm-9vvv-64w8
- Maintainer advisory GHSA-x7mm-9vvv-64w8
Fencer Intel keeps one entry per vulnerability: the CVE id wins, then GHSA, and records that alias each other are merged, except that two CVEs always keep separate entries. The same data is available as JSON.
The maintainers of unjs/unhead published their own advisory on GitHub. Reviewed sources take precedence over it.