HSEC-2026-0015 json
Missing validation of CONNECT requests in http2
published 2d ago modified 2d ago
- cvss
- 6.5
- version 3.1, OSV
- cisa kev
- Not listed
- not in CISA's catalog
- epss
- —
- no score, EPSS covers CVEs only
- public exploits
- 0
- none known
Summary
# Missing validation of CONNECT requests in http2
For CONNECT requests, `checkRequestHeader` (`Network/HTTP2/H2/HPACK.hs`) in http2 up to 5.4.13 returned early, only requiring the absence of `:scheme` and `:path`. Every other check was skipped:
* the requirement that `:authority` is present (RFC 9113, Section 8.5); * the check that `:authority` and `Host` agree, which applies to every other request (RFC 9113, Section 8.3.1: a server SHOULD treat a mismatch as malformed); * the common checks for `:status`, `Connection` and `TE`.
A CONNECT request carrying `:authority: a.example` and `Host: b.example` was therefore accepted. Consumers that read `Host` see `b.example` where intermediaries that read `:authority` see `a.example`. warp, for example, sets `requestHeaderHost` to `Host` when present and falls back to `:authority`, so an application behind an intermediary that routes or authorizes on `:authority` handles a request other than the one the intermediary validated — a request can be smuggled past the front-end's access control, validation, logging or WAF rules.
Exploitation requires a front-end that makes decisions based on `:authority` while the application behind it bases routing or authorization on `Host`; a directly exposed server sees only one authority.
A CONNECT request with neither `:authority` nor `:path` also passed validation and reached warp 3.4.21, where `fromJust (mPath <|> mAuth)` (`Network/Wai/Handler/Warp/HTTP2/Request.hs`) threw. The exception was raised in the stream's worker thread, so it reset one stream and did not affect the server process.
## Resolution
http2 5.4.14 validates CONNECT requests like every other request: `:authority` is required, `:scheme` and `:path` are forbidden, and the common checks apply, including the `:authority`/`Host` consistency check. A malformed request is rejected with a stream error of type `PROTOCOL_ERROR`, leaving the connection itself in place. With every request thus carrying `:path` or `:authority` when it reaches warp, the `fromJust` can no longer fail, so warp needs no change.
The same release also stops the server from pushing on a request that has no `:scheme` or `:authority`, where a push previously crashed on the missing `:scheme`.
Upgrade to http2 5.4.14 or later. Series before 4.0 performed no `:authority`/`Host` consistency check at all, for any request, and are unsupported; upgrade regardless.
## Credits
Reported by Akash Sebastian (@akashseb). Validated and fixed by Kazu Yamamoto.
Patch / fix
- hackage http2 5.4.14
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Check with FencerCVSS scores
| assigned by | version | score | vector |
|---|---|---|---|
| OSV | 3.1 | 6.5 | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N |
Affected packages
| ecosystem | package | affected | fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| hackage | http2 | >=4.0.0, <5.4.14 |
5.4.14 |
References
Sources
- OSV HSEC-2026-0015
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