HSEC-2026-0016 json
Improper IP address validation in validateCertificateName
published 2d ago modified 2d ago
- cvss
- 7.4
- version 3.1, OSV
- cisa kev
- Not listed
- not in CISA's catalog
- epss
- —
- no score, EPSS covers CVEs only
- public exploits
- 0
- none known
Summary
# Improper IP address validation in validateCertificateName
`Data.X509.Validation.getNames` extracts only `AltNameDNS` entries from the subjectAltName extension (Data/X509/Validation.hs, `unAltName`, ~L512–515 in crypton-x509-validation 1.10.1). When a certificate carries an `iPAddress` SAN but no `dNSName` SAN, the extracted name list is empty, so `validateNames` (~L569–580) falls through to the commonName branch as if no SAN extension existed, even though the extension's haddock promises that the commonName is ignored whenever subjectAltName is present. Consequently, when a client connects to an IP literal:
* a certificate with `CN = <target IP>` but `iPAddress` SAN pointing to a different host is **accepted**; * a certificate whose only valid identity is a matching `iPAddress` SAN is **rejected**.
Exploitation requires a certificate from a CA the client trusts that has a commonName different from its iPAddress SAN (public CAs are barred from this by the CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements, but private or enterprise CAs can issue such certificates). A successful impersonation exposes and can modify the protected connection.
The draft fix makes `getNames` distinguish "no SAN extension" from "SAN extension present with no DNS names" and applies SAN semantics (including the existing iPAddress comparison) whenever the extension is present, restoring the documented SAN-supersedes-CN behavior in line with RFC 9525. No fixed release is published at the time of writing (1.10.1 is the latest release and still vulnerable).
## Credits
Reported by Dickson Wu (SEAL & CertiK). Validated and fixed by Kazu Yamamoto.
Patch / fix
- hackage crypton-x509-validation 1.10.2
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Check with FencerCVSS scores
| assigned by | version | score | vector |
|---|---|---|---|
| OSV | 3.1 | 7.4 | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N |
Affected packages
| ecosystem | package | affected | fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| hackage | crypton-x509-validation | >=1.6.12, <1.10.2 |
1.10.2 |
References
Sources
- OSV HSEC-2026-0016
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