RUSTSEC-2026-0127 json
Integer overflow in `array::ReadWrite::new()` leading to potential memory corruption
published 6mo ago modified 5mo ago
- cvss
- —
- not scored
- cisa kev
- Not listed
- not in CISA's catalog
- epss
- —
- no score, EPSS covers CVEs only
- public exploits
- 0
- none known
Summary
In `array::ReadWrite::new()` (line 83 of `accessor/src/array.rs`), `let bytes = mem::size_of::<T>() * len` can overflow `usize` when `len` is very large. In release mode, this silently wraps, potentially making `bytes = 0`. The mapper then maps with 0 bytes, and subsequent accesses (e.g. `read_volatile_at`) lead to undefined behavior or memory corruption.
Note: `array::ReadWrite::new()` itself is `unsafe`, so direct triggering requires an `unsafe` block. However, the integer overflow violates the implicit safety contract expected by callers and can lead to memory corruption downstream.
Is RUSTSEC-2026-0127 in your dependencies? Fencer shows which of your repositories are affected as soon as an advisory lands, and opens the fix as a pull request.
Check with FencerAffected packages
| ecosystem | package | affected | fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| crates.io | accessor | >=0.0.0-0 |
no fix listed |
References
Sources
Fencer Intel keeps one entry per vulnerability: the CVE id wins, then GHSA, and records that alias each other are merged, except that two CVEs always keep separate entries. The same data is available as JSON.