RUSTSEC-2026-0195 json
Unbounded namespace-declaration allocation in `NsReader` enables memory-exhaustion denial of service
published 4mo ago modified 4mo ago
- cvss
- 7.5
- version 3.1, OSV
- cisa kev
- Not listed
- not in CISA's catalog
- epss
- —
- no score, EPSS covers CVEs only
- public exploits
- 0
- none known
Summary
`NsReader` resolves namespaces by calling `NamespaceResolver::push` for every `Start`/`Empty` event *before* the event is returned to the caller. `push` iterated all `xmlns` / `xmlns:*` attributes on the start tag and, for each one, appended the prefix bytes to an internal buffer and pushed a `NamespaceBinding` (32 bytes on 64-bit) to an internal `Vec`, with no upper bound on the number of declarations.
## Impact
A start tag with `N` namespace declarations drove roughly `3×` the tag's byte size in `NamespaceResolver` heap, allocated *inside* `quick-xml` before the `NsReader` consumer ever received the event and could inspect or reject it. A consumer that bounds its *input* size therefore still cannot bound this allocation: an `M`-byte start tag yields on the order of `3 × M` bytes of resolver heap the caller never sees.
On untrusted XML this lets a remote, unauthenticated attacker force large heap allocations with a single start tag. With several `NsReader`s running concurrently on independent inputs (a common server pattern), the allocations stack and can exhaust process memory, causing the operating system to kill the process (OOM). This was confirmed against a real-world RPKI relying party (NLnet Labs Routinator), where concurrent RRDP validation workers parsing a crafted `snapshot.xml` exceeded the memory limit and the process was OOM-killed.
## Affected code paths
Consumers using `NsReader` (which always calls `NamespaceResolver::push` before yielding `Start`/`Empty`), or calling `NamespaceResolver::push` directly. A plain `Reader` that does not perform namespace resolution is not affected.
## Remediation
Upgrade to `quick-xml >= 0.41.0`. `NamespaceResolver::push` now rejects a start tag that declares more than `DEFAULT_MAX_DECLARATIONS_PER_ELEMENT` (256) namespace bindings, returning the new `NamespaceError::TooManyDeclarations` instead of allocating without limit. The limit is configurable via `NamespaceResolver::set_max_declarations_per_element` (use `usize::MAX` to restore the previous unbounded behavior), and `NsReader::resolver_mut()` is provided to reach it.
There is no clean workaround for `NsReader` consumers before 0.41.0, as the allocation happens inside the reader with no configuration knob to cap it.
Patch / fix
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Check with FencerCVSS scores
| assigned by | version | score | vector |
|---|---|---|---|
| OSV | 3.1 | 7.5 | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H |
Affected packages
| ecosystem | package | affected | fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| crates.io | quick-xml | >=0.0.0-0, <0.41.0 |
0.41.0 |
References
Sources
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