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RUSTSEC-2026-0282 json

Double free in `AlignedBox<[T]>::realloc_with_default` when an element's `Drop` panics

published 2mo ago modified 2mo ago

cvss
—
not scored
cisa kev
Not listed
not in CISA's catalog
epss
—
no score, EPSS covers CVEs only
public exploits
0
none known

Summary

Shrinking an `AlignedBox<[T]>` takes ownership of the buffer out of `self.container` with `ManuallyDrop::take`, destroys the elements past the new length, and only then commits the new `Box` back into `self.container`. `ManuallyDrop::take` moves ownership but not the bits, so until that commit `self.container` still points at the original buffer.

`T::drop` runs inside the destruction loop and is user code — `T` carries no bound that would exclude a panicking `Drop`. If it unwinds, the commit is skipped and `self.container` is left pointing at the buffer whose tail has already been destroyed. `AlignedBox`'s own destructor then reconstructs a `Box` from that pointer, drops every element again and deallocates — a double free (CWE-415) / use-after-free (CWE-416) reachable from safe Rust.

Growing the slice destroys nothing and is unaffected, as is `realloc_with_value`, which requires `T: Copy` and therefore a `Drop` that cannot run.

## Mitigation

Update to 0.3.1.

Patch / fix

  • crates.io aligned_box 0.3.1

Is RUSTSEC-2026-0282 in your dependencies? Fencer shows which of your repositories are affected as soon as an advisory lands, and opens the fix as a pull request.

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Affected packages

ecosystem package affected fixed in
crates.io aligned_box
>=0.0.0-0, <0.3.1
0.3.1

References

Sources

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