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RUSTSEC-2026-0301 json

Double free in `StackVec::retain` when a predicate or element `Drop` panics

published last mo. modified last mo.

cvss
—
not scored
cisa kev
Not listed
not in CISA's catalog
epss
—
no score, EPSS covers CVEs only
public exploits
0
none known

Summary

## Summary

`StackVec::retain` committed its new length to `self.len` only after its internal loop completed. If the retain predicate or a removed element's `Drop` implementation panicked before the loop finished, unwinding proceeded with `self.len` still equal to the original, pre-retain length, leaving either a duplicated or already-destroyed element inside `0..len`. `StackVec`'s own `Drop` then revisited that slot, causing a double-drop (and for heap-owning types, a double-free).

## Impact

Affects `StackVec<T, CAP>::retain` for `T: Drop` types where the predicate or the removed element's destructor can panic, on builds with unwinding enabled (`panic = "unwind"`). `no_std`/`panic = "abort"` builds cannot trigger this, since unwinding never occurs.

## Patch

Fixed in 0.3.3 using an unwind-safe backshift guard, matching the approach `alloc::vec::Vec::retain` uses.

Patch / fix

  • crates.io stack_collections 0.3.3

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Affected packages

ecosystem package affected fixed in
crates.io stack_collections
>=0.3.0, <0.3.3
0.3.3

References

Sources

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