RUSTSEC-2026-0330 json
Hybrid Encapsulation from Seed Panics on Short Seed
published last mo. modified last mo.
- cvss
- —
- not scored
- cisa kev
- Not listed
- not in CISA's catalog
- epss
- —
- no score, EPSS covers CVEs only
- public exploits
- 0
- none known
Summary
For a hybrid KEM public key of type `PublicKey::WingKemDraft06` or `PublicKey::X25519MlKem768Draft06`, the `PublicKey::encapsulate_derand` function would panic in an indexing operation on a seed input of length shorter than 32 bytes.
# Impact
Applications encapsulating with an attacker controlled seed value could be made to panic. Since the encapsulation seed should be considered a secret of the encapsulating party for the KEM to remain secure, an application should never take the seed value from a potentially attacker controlled source.
# Mitigation
With release of version `0.0.10` of `libcrux-kem` this bug has been fixed and the serialization functions return `InvalidPrivateKey` and `InvalidPublicKey` errors on invalid input buffer lengths.
We recommend users upgrade to `libcrux-kem` version `0.0.10`.
Patch / fix
Is RUSTSEC-2026-0330 in your dependencies? Fencer shows which of your repositories are affected as soon as an advisory lands, and opens the fix as a pull request.
Check with FencerAffected packages
| ecosystem | package | affected | fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| crates.io | libcrux-kem | >=0.0.0-0, <0.0.10 |
0.0.10 |
References
Sources
Fencer Intel keeps one entry per vulnerability: the CVE id wins, then GHSA, and records that alias each other are merged, except that two CVEs always keep separate entries. The same data is available as JSON.