RUSTSEC-2026-0398 json
`Seekable::decompress` sets a `Vec` length beyond its capacity for offsets past the end
published 26d ago modified 10d ago
- cvss
- —
- not scored
- cisa kev
- Not listed
- not in CISA's catalog
- epss
- —
- no score, EPSS covers CVEs only
- public exploits
- 0
- none known
Summary
`ZSTD_seekable_decompress` shortens the requested length to the end of the data without checking that the offset is before it. For an offset past the end, it returns a wrapped-around length without writing anything, and `Seekable::decompress` passed that length to `Vec::set_len`.
With the `seekable` feature, whoever supplies the archive, or chooses the offset, can leave the caller's `Vec<u8>` with a length far beyond its capacity. Reading it then discloses neighbouring heap memory, and appending to it corrupts memory. Offsets near `u64::MAX` can also hang the call.
The flaw was corrected by clamping requests to the end of the data, and by checking every count reported by the C library against the buffer capacity.
Patch / fix
- crates.io zstd-safe 7.4.0, 8.2.0
- github.com/gyscos/zstd-rs@80506be commit
- github.com/gyscos/zstd-rs#384 pull request
Is RUSTSEC-2026-0398 in your dependencies? Fencer shows which of your repositories are affected as soon as an advisory lands, and opens the fix as a pull request.
Check with FencerAffected packages
| ecosystem | package | affected | fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| crates.io | zstd-safe | >=7.2.2, <7.4.0 >=8.0.0-0, <8.2.0 |
7.4.0 8.2.0 |
References
Sources
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