RUSTSEC-2026-0411 json
Out-of-bounds read in `Log2Cache::nlog2n()`, `nlog2n_difference()` and `plog2p()`
published 20d ago modified 16d ago
- cvss
- —
- not scored
- cisa kev
- Not listed
- not in CISA's catalog
- epss
- —
- no score, EPSS covers CVEs only
- public exploits
- 0
- none known
Summary
`Log2Cache::new(n)` fills its three tables with entries for `0..=n`, but the three accessor methods index those tables with `get_unchecked` on a value the caller supplies. Nothing bounds the argument and nothing documents a bound, so any value above the `n` the cache was built with reads past the end of the vector. `CountType` is `u32`, so the read can land up to `u32::MAX` elements away, and `plog2p()` returns the value it read, disclosing whatever lies there.
For example, `Log2Cache::new(4)` builds tables holding 5 entries (indices 0,1,2,3,4). Then `cache.nlog2n(60000)` reads index 60000, far outside the allocation. Under AddressSanitizer this faults with `SEGV`; Miri reports it as undefined behavior at `src/log2cache.rs:42`.
`nlog2n_difference()` is off by one further: in the affected versions `new(n)` pushes `n` entries into that table rather than `n + 1`, so even `nlog2n_difference(n)` is out of bounds.
This can be triggered through safe public APIs — `Log2Cache::new()` and any of `nlog2n()`, `nlog2n_difference()` and `plog2p()` — with no `unsafe` required from the caller.
Patch / fix
- crates.io dahl-salso 0.7.0
Is RUSTSEC-2026-0411 in your dependencies? Fencer shows which of your repositories are affected as soon as an advisory lands, and opens the fix as a pull request.
Check with FencerAffected packages
| ecosystem | package | affected | fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| crates.io | dahl-salso | >=0.0.0-0, <0.7.0 |
0.7.0 |
References
Sources
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